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Outside the Public Eye:
How the Carter Administration Used “Quiet Diplomacy” to 
Impact Human Rights in Argentina
Julia LaBua
From the beginning of his campaign to become President of the United 
States, Jimmy Carter spoke frequently and forcefully about the role human rights 
should play in issues of U.S. foreign policy. Carter believed that such policy was a 
necessary corrective to the overt support given by the Nixon and Ford administrations 
for right-wing military regimes that routinely violated human rights on the pretext 
of countering the threat of communist revolution. Support for such abusive 
regimes, Carter felt, went against the principles upon which the United States had 
been founded, and had damaged the image of the United States around the world. 
Carter believed it was possible to maintain vigilance against communist insurgency 
without condoning human rights abuses, and he found allies in the U.S. Congress, 
where several pieces of legislation had been passed prior to his election seeking to 
limit or prevent the U.S. from granting military or economic aid to countries whose 
governments systematically abused human rights. 
Throughout his presidency (1977-1981), Carter never wavered in his public 
support for a foreign policy that took human rights into account. In numerous 
speeches, as well as formal and informal news conferences, he reaffirmed his 
campaign rhetoric calling for the United States to once again live up to the ideals 
found in its Constitution. Despite Carter’s consistent rhetoric, media accounts during 
his administration reveal a general impression that Carter’s devotion to his so-called 
“human rights crusade” was mere lip service, impractical in the face of geopolitical 
reality. Carter was forced to defend the apparent contradictions between rhetoric 
and action in a televised interview with news anchor Barbara Walters. Members 
of Congress who had been instrumental in passing human rights legislation before 
Carter took office also publicly criticized how those legislative mandates were 
implemented. Legislative prohibitions on military aid to countries committing 
human rights abuses, for example, were so narrowly defined by administration 
officials as to allow aid shipments to continue.
U.S. government documents declassified in recent years, however, show 
that at least in one case (Argentina), the relative lack of public condemnation by 
Carter Administration officials for the military regime’s atrocious behavior masked 
a successful campaign of “quiet diplomacy” being conducted out of the public 
eye which sought to convince the Argentinean regime to end its human rights 
abuses. The declassified documents also show that while Carter and some of his 
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administrative staff — notably Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights — were committed to incorporating human rights as an element 
of official foreign policy, they were fighting explicit and implicit messages to the 
contrary sent to foreign governments about whether the U.S. emphasis on human 
rights was anything more than political rhetoric. Carter adopted the strategy of 
quiet diplomacy in an attempt to craft a human rights-centered foreign policy that 
would satisfy various factions within and outside of the U.S. government. Some 
members of Congress and the NGO community believed that the human rights-
based foreign policy must be implemented in toto, without exceptions and without 
regard to national security or other foreign-policy considerations. Other members 
of Congress and the administration also supported a human rights policy but were 
primarily interested in wielding it as an anti-communist tool against the Soviet 
Union and other communist regimes. And still other officials, including many in the 
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, had no patience at all 
for talk of human rights, believing that the hard-line foreign policy initiated during 
the Nixon and Ford administrations should be continued. The reduction in numbers 
of detained political prisoners in Argentina over the course of Carter’s time in office 
shows that contrary to public perception, the strategy of quiet diplomacy had a 
significant impact on the actions of the military regime in Argentina.
The Origins of Carter’s Human Rights Crusade
In the months leading up to the 1976 presidential election and after he took 
office, Carter spoke frequently about his vision of crafting a foreign policy based 
at least in part on encouraging other countries to uphold internationally recognized 
human rights. In the speech he gave announcing his candidacy in December 1974, 
Carter expressed a vision of the United States as a country that could once again 
“set a standard within the community of nations of courage, compassion, integrity, 
and dedication to basic human rights and freedoms.”1 In his January 1977 inaugural 
address, Carter stated, “Our commitment to human rights must be absolute.”2 In 
speeches he gave to the Organization of American States at the beginning and 
end of his presidency, Carter spoke of human rights as a value shared by the U.S. 
and Latin America. “Our own concern for these values will naturally influence 
our relations with the countries of this hemisphere and throughout the world,” he 
said in 1977.3 The message was similar in 1980: “Today no government in this 
hemisphere can expect silent assent from its neighbors if it tramples the rights of 
its own citizens.”4  
Carter’s human rights rhetoric was undoubtedly a change of pace for the 
executive branch, but it was not the first initiative within the U.S. government 
to make human rights a centerpiece of foreign policy decisions. Years before 
Carter’s election, Congress had passed a series of bills aimed at requiring foreign 
governments to meet certain human rights standards in order to be eligible for 
economic or military aid from the United States. One of the earliest was the 1973 
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Foreign Assistance Act, drafted by Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.), which called for 
the president to deny aid to any foreign government that “practices the internment 
or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.”5 In 1975, Sen. 
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) helped pass an amendment to the International Development 
and Food Assistance Act that prohibited U.S. aid to any country that consistently 
violated human rights. Legislation passed in 1976 directed U.S. representatives 
at the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Fund to 
vote against loans to governments that had engaged in “systematic and gross” 
violations of human rights. That same year, Congress established a new appointment 
for Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the State 
Department (later renamed the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights). 6 
During Carter’s time in office, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, which specifically prohibited military aid to 
Argentina on human rights grounds.7
A variety of non-governmental organizations also were lobbying during this 
time for more attention to be paid to human rights. Perhaps the most well known 
was Amnesty International, founded in 1961, but also active at the time was the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an outgrowth of the National Council 
of Churches, and the International Commission of Jurists. WOLA, in particular, 
has been credited with having provided many of the documents and witnesses for 
the 1973 hearings held by Fraser’s Subcommittee on International Organizations 
and Movements that produced an influential report, “Human Rights in the World 
Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership.”8 The hearings and report were the basis 
for Fraser’s landmark Foreign Assistance Act. The influence of NGOs went beyond 
lobbying Congress, however. Amnesty International’s publication of country reports 
detailing human rights abuses and its letter-writing campaigns focused on specific 
political prisoners, put the issue of human rights abuses before the public, both in 
the United States and around the world.9
Mixed Signals from Within and Without
Despite Carter’s emphatic public statements on the importance of human 
rights in his foreign policy decisions, members of the media and the public 
remained skeptical about the extent to which his unquestioned personal commitment 
translated into active policy. In a television interview with the president and his wife 
in December 1978, ABC News anchor Barbara Walters asked about the perceived 
gap between his speeches and his actions: “People said to me, ‘You’re going to 
interview the President. Okay, ask him why he doesn’t pursue human rights in the 
Philippines. Ask him why he doesn’t do it in Chile. Ask him why he waited so long 
in Iran.’”10 Carter’s response to Walters was that governments in those countries and 
others had in fact felt the pressure from his administration and reacted accordingly, 
though he offered her national television audience no specific examples. Carter’s 
failure to delineate specific consequences for countries that violated human rights 
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likely contributed to public perceptions that the administration’s actions did not live 
up to its stated intentions. 
Carter’s rhetoric about valuing human rights in foreign policy considerations 
contrasted sharply with signals sent during the Nixon and Ford administrations, 
which were mixed at best. A 1976 report written by Robert Hill, then U.S. 
ambassador to Argentina, about a meeting with Cesar Guzzetti, Foreign Minister of 
Argentina, states that Guzzetti found Hill’s expression of U.S. concern over human-
rights violations in Argentina puzzling in light of a recent conversation he had had 
with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Santiago, Chile. Guzzetti said 
Kissinger had “hoped the Argentine government could get the terrorist problem 
under control as quickly as possible.” Kissinger’s statement was interpreted by 
Argentina’s President Jorge Videla (Guzzetti told Hill) as revealing that the United 
States’ “overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA [Government 
of Argentina] ‘get it over quickly’.”11 Similarly, a report from Carter’s Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance offers details of a January 1977 meeting between a State 
Department officer and Victor Beauge, Political Counselor of Argentina. According 
to the report, Beauge sought assurances that embassy officials in Buenos Aires were 
delivering the same message about U.S. commitment to human rights as the State 
Department. “Beauge persisted, asking if these points had been made by new rpt 
[repeat] new administration. He said, ‘It is essential for your same message to come 
from all channels. This did not happen in past.’”12
There are indications that the mixed messages continued into the Carter 
Administration. Unpublished notes written by Assistant Secretary Derian in April 
1977 after a visit to Argentina reveal that a consistent message on human rights was 
an elusive goal early in the administration.  She warned that the U.S. was sending 
“a dangerous and double message” to Argentina and other countries. “It is widely 
believed by our military and intelligence services that the human rights policy 
emanates only from the Department of State, is a political device and one with a 
short life due to its wide impracticality, the naiveté and ignorance of individuals 
in the Administration and to the irresponsible headline-grabbing of members of 
Congress,” she wrote. Derian recommended that Carter send a message to all 
branches of the military, the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies emphasizing 
the seriousness and permanence of the human rights policy, and that officials who 
were unable to comply with his directive “be immediately separated from their 
services.” 13 The Argentinean confusion persisted well into the Carter presidency, 
as illustrated by a report prepared in September 1978 by the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) for Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs. The Argentinean government, the report stated, believed that “U.S. protests 
[about human rights] ere largely perfunctory, a temporary outburst of moral fervor 
reflecting pressure from a few misguided human rights zealots in the Congress 
and non-governmental organizations.”14 It’s not clear from the report whether the 
confusion was a case of wishful thinking on the part of Argentinean leaders or 
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continued mixed messages from various U.S. official entities, but the end result was 
the same: an apparent lack of clear motivation for the Argentinean regime to reform 
its rights violations.
The Congress that served alongside Carter was not as ideal an ally in his 
human rights crusade as it might appear at first glance. While legislative acts such 
as those listed above attempted to tie foreign aid to respect for human rights, the 
term “human rights” was not clearly defined in any of them, leaving the granting 
or denial of aid more or less in the eye of the beholder.15 Complicating matters, 
Congressional supporters of tying aid to human rights abuses had differing 
agendas: some conservative members of Congress envisioned the legislation being 
used primarily against the Soviet Union and other leftist or potentially communist 
regimes; liberal Congressmen placed more emphasis on enforcing the restrictions 
against totalitarian regimes such as those in Latin America, including Argentina.16 
This inherent tension within Congress, along with the Carter Administration’s 
insistence on applying the policy framework on a case-by-case basis, meant that 
no blanket definition of human rights or human rights abuses could be formulated 
that would apply to all countries. The policy’s implementation appeared uneven 
and seemingly arbitrary to observers – such as the general media – not aware of the 
painstaking work done by the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign 
Assistance. This working group, headed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, worked throughout the first six months of Carter’s presidency to define 
the administration’s human rights policy.17
The uneven nature of the policy’s application is evident even within a 
single country such as Argentina. All military aid to Argentina was halted during 
the Carter Administration, but it was not entirely by U.S. action. Secretary Vance 
announced a sharp reduction in military aid in February 1977, but it was Argentina 
itself that refused to accept additional aid as long as human rights conditions were 
attached. The reduction in aid also only applied to certain categories of military 
aid, with a rationalization that selling “non-lethal” supplies or existing parts for 
military weapons and systems was not covered by the ban. Congress, not Carter, 
implemented a more complete cutoff of military sales and aid to Argentina in October 
1978.18 Similarly, economic aid to Argentina was reduced, as in the case of the 
denial of loan credits, but most other economic credits and loans from international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank were approved despite “no” votes or 
abstentions by the U.S. representatives – in Argentina’s case, this totaled 23 loans 
between January 1977 and August 1980 –
making the policy’s effect more symbolic than concrete. The votes did serve to 
focus international attention on the U.S. position, however, and could be seen as 
part of the system of indirect pressure administered by the Carter administration.19
The Advent of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’
Even while public sanctions were being attempted with mixed results, 
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behind-the-scenes or “quiet” diplomacy continued. During her visit to Argentina in 
April 1977, Derian delivered to regime officials a private rebuke of their failure to 
respect the human rights of their political opponents. As detailed in the notes of her 
visit, Derian was careful not to antagonize the Argentinean leaders. She expressed 
sympathy for their struggles with terrorists, and reaffirmed the ultimate sovereignty 
of the regime. Nonetheless, she strongly encouraged the Argentine government to 
return to internationally recognized standards of law, while refusing to condone 
the methods used against their opponents: “… Never concede that they are not 
violating human rights. Impress the serious nature of our concern and the fact that 
it is here to stay,” she wrote in a section of her notes titled “What I Told Them.” 20
A similar diplomatic strategy was outlined in a memo written by an unknown 
State Department staff member in May 1977 for Terence Todman, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in advance of a trip to Argentina. 
The memo offers a series of “talking points” for Todman to use in his meetings 
with Argentinean officials. Among them: “The impression must be corrected that 
the Argentinean government is not in full control and must resort to mysterious 
right wing forces and unexplained disappearances to root out terrorism” and “We 
strongly urge the acknowledgment of all prisoners under detention, the restoration 
of due process, and the punishment of all excesses.”21  Once again, the quiet message 
being delivered to Argentinean officials is unambiguous: No excuses or rationale 
will be accepted for the continued violation of opponents’ human rights.
These efforts at quiet diplomacy yielded results. An August 1978 memo 
from Ambassador Castro to Secretary Vance reported, among other things, that “we 
believe that a number of these reported [interrogation] enters have been closed 
down as the Argentine security forces have reduced the scale of their anti-subversive 
operations.”22 And even as the Barbara Walters interview with Carter was being 
televised in December of that year, negotiations were ongoing through diplomatic 
channels between members of Carter’s administration and the government of 
Argentina for a full accounting to be made of detained prisoners, whose numbers 
had in fact already declined by more than half, from 8,200 in 1974 to 3,400 in 
1978.23 
Once the efforts of quiet diplomacy began to pay dividends, the tenor changed 
in the conversation between U.S. and Argentinean officials. A private discussion 
in September 1979 between Townsend B. Friedman, political officer at the U.S. 
Embassy in Buenos Aires, and an unnamed “senior member of a major Argentine 
military intelligence organization” revealed that the attention of Argentinean leaders 
was beginning to shift from how to continue with or cover up their human rights 
violations to how to avoid being held accountable for them:
Some of those most deeply involved in the “dirty war” are terribly 
frightened that as the climate returns to normality they are being 
moved closer to the time when they must account for their acts and 
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suffer retribution. On the other hand, if the “dirty war” can be kept 
going they are protected … If the USG [U.S. Government] wanted 
to do something useful for human rights, he suggested, it would help 
establish a climate where it would be possible for the GOA to drop 
a curtain over the past or a curtain that would eliminate the fear that 
drives the men involved in the dirty war.24
The Argentine military official seems to be asking Friedman to promise U.S. support 
of an amnesty policy to be implemented once the military regime stepped aside. 
Friedman believed this communication was a concrete indication that Carter’s 
quiet diplomacy was paying dividends. It was a reflection of similar conversations 
he had had with human rights activists in Argentina, one of them a “foreign 
correspondent who has been observing Argentina for several years” and a critic of 
the military regime. “Others in the human rights community are very pleased with 
our outspokenness,” Friedman reports.25
The Argentinean government’s initial impression of Carter’s human rights 
emphasis as mere rhetoric rather than a serious policy probably played a role in 
the slowness of its response to U.S. calls to end its rights violations. As early as 
February 1977, U.S. officials were pressuring the Argentinean regime to publish 
lists of its thousands of political detainees, to re-establish laws to make future 
arrests a matter of public record, to allow prisoners to mount a legal defense.26 The 
Argentines did not begin to publish the lists until December of that year, and they 
were still not complete by March 1978, according to a memo from Raul Castro, U.S. 
Ambassador to Argentina, which also recommends that the U.S. concentrate further 
efforts on persuading Argentina to make “continued progress toward return to the 
rule of law.”27 The failure of Argentinean leaders to comply with an unpublicized 
agreement with the U.S. to release prisoners, as well as to allow access to prisoners 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, was the impetus in August 
1978 for the State Department to instruct the Export-Import Bank to withhold more 
than $200 million promised for Argentina’s Yacyreta dam project.28 
Conclusion
Viewing these declassified U.S. government documents in sequence brings 
the scope, strategy and outcomes of the Carter Administration’s human rights-based 
foreign policy into sharper focus, at least as it was practiced in Argentina. A review 
of Carter’s foreign policy decisions during his presidency reveals unarguable 
inconsistencies in how the policy was implemented globally, and the uneven 
effectiveness of public sanctions such as cutting off foreign aid to violators of human 
rights. But the diplomatic memos and notes show that despite perceptions within 
the U.S. public, media, and Congress that inconsistencies in the policy rendered 
it ineffective, there was a steady, unswerving use of quiet diplomacy. What made 
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quiet diplomacy so effective was its consistency and persistence. Whether the envoy 
was Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman, or U.S. Embassy’s political officer 
Townsend Friedman, the message remained the same: U.S. respect for Argentina’s 
sovereignty coupled with a refusal to accept human rights violations and a belief that 
regardless of past action, the Argentinean regime was capable of reforming itself 
and once again implementing the rule of law. This diplomatic effort, combined with 
occasional public demonstrations that there would be consequences for continued 
violations – such as the Yacyreta dam project loan rejection – elicited positive if not 
cataclysmic changes in the scale of human-rights abuses being perpetrated by the 
military regime of Argentina.  
This paper was written for Professor Michel Gobat’s Latin America & the United States: The 
Historical Perspective. I would like to thank Professor Gobat for his comments and suggestions on 
the initial drafts of this paper. The paper was named the UI Center for Human Rights’ 2007 winner 
of the undergraduate division of the Burns H. Weston International Human Rights Essay Prize.  
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